Destined to be at Odds

Slava Surkov has been showing up frequently in the past few days.  First, for the fifth anniversary of Nashi, where he reportedly said:

If we all go on vacation, the consequences won’t wait. We see what’s happening in Kyrgyzstan — that means we’re needed and have to be at our posts. … Those who chose for themselves the political fight will never be able to relax again….

Well, okay then…

Abductions, Chechnya, and Al Jazeera

I found this story on my Google Reader, but the details were vague, and I was curious to see what other information I could find.  A quick Google News search directed me to this story from Al Jazeera: Chechen rights activist ‘abducted’.  A somewhat different interpretation from the first story, but not necessarily wrong.  Actually, I find it to be much more believable.

The reason I am posting this is because it, once again, forces us to confront the problem of Ramzan Kadyrov. We were told that Chechenisation would solve the problems in Chechnya.  But that is simply not true.  When you have a President of a republic who can commit murder in another country with impunity, or can kidnap a man off the street in Moscow with no questions asked, you have a problem.  And not just a problem with Ramzan Kadyrov as an individual, but with the entire system that was set up by Putin, and Surkov (the supposed author of Chechenisation).  And it proves that Putin’s regional policies have failed miserably.

Translation

of Vladislav Surkov’s recent interview with Alexander Chudodeyev at Itogi.  I want to go through this line by line with a red pen, because that is what I generally do with Slava’s interviews.  In general, I feel like Slava is saying the right things, but I am not convinced that he is being entirely honest.  He repeats several times the fact that Russia is “a raw material country”, and seems to imply that he sees this as a bad thing.

Surkov & the Civiliki

As you may or may not have noticed, I am a bit obsessed with Slava Surkov.  It has gotten to the point where even I wonder if I have imbued him with more qualities than he actually possesses.  So, I was surprised to discover myself a little sceptical of Stratfor’s breakdown of the clans within the Kremlin.  I do not disagree with the essence of what Friedman says, but with certain facts, and his interpretation of those facts.

I am Wearing Black

today because I assume you are in mourning.”

Note the use of the pronoun “you”.  Not “we are in mourning”.  But “you are in mourning”.

When I first saw the video, it appeared as though Medvedev was wearing a red shirt, and I wondered at the significance of that.  But then I looked for pictures, and he is wearing all black.

I am also having difficulty identifying everyone at the table here.  But I found a list of names, and their titles in Russian.  Those in attendance were:

Boris Gryzlov — Duma Chairman;

Sergei Mironov — Federal Chamber Chairman;

Vladimir Zhirinovsky — Liberal Democratic Party Chairman;

Gennady Zyuganov — Communist Party Chairman;

Igor Lebedev — Faction Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in the State Duma (also happens to be the son of Vladimir Zhirinovsky);

Nikolai Levichev — A Just Rusia Party Chairman (next to Gryzlov in the photo);

Vyacheslav Volodin — Deputy Speaker of the State Duma;

Ivan Melnikov — vice-chairman of the Communist Party;

Vladislav Surkov — First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration.

For more pictures go here, here, and here.

I Did Not Come From Mars

This is the title of the video from Slava’s recent speech to the Public Chamber.  It comes from a portion of the speech where Slava says, “I did not come from Mars.  I am a guy.  I began work as usual.  I worked at a business.  At a big business.  I was born in the state.  I am not trying to pretend.  I am one of you.”

Speaking of being one of us, Slava may have a MySpace page.  This is almost reason alone for me to go and join MySpace.  If this is truly Slava, I am a happy woman.

Loyalty As A Litmus Test

Most people seem to expect that something big will happen within the next month, or so.  Not as big as Sonin’s daydream, but something kind of big.  Medvedev’s speech to the Federal Assembly is coming up, and the expectation is that at least one person will be “transferred”.  The rumours have taken on a life of their own after the recent walkout in the Duma.

Alexei Chadaev

In light of the rumours of a reshuffle going on in the Presidential Administration, I want to address the issue of Alexei Chadaev.  At 31 years of age, Chadaev has accomplished quite a lot.  He is a graduate of the State Academy of Slavic Culture, and a member of the Public Chamber.  The most interesting thing about Alexei, however, is his book entitled, Putin.  His Ideology. Chadaev was praised quite highly for this at the time, including from one of my favourite people Vladislav Surkov.

What confuses me is what FT has to say about Chadaev:

Alexei Chadaev, a conservative political commentator, is expected shortly to be named as a speechwriter working alongside the Kremlin’s first deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov, who oversees management of the Kremlin’s domestic political machine. Mr Chadaev is known for a public criticism of Mr Surkov’s ideology in January. Yet to be confirmed, his appointment has been widely reported by Moscow papers with close links to the Kremlin and people in the Kremlin have confirmed that background checks are being carried out.

I suppose Chadaev could be considered “conservative”, but in Russia my definition of conservative is someone along the lines of Eduard Limonov, the leader of the National Bolsheviks.  However, Chadaev was (I have been unable find out if he still is) involved with Nashi.  Often compared to the Hitler Youth by opponents, Nashi is also quite conservative.  Since FT reports that there was some kind of falling out between Surkov, and Chadaev, I assume that Chadaev is no longer involved with Nashi.

Chadaev is also involved with a website called liberty.ru, which seems to be connected in some way to Gleb Pavlovsky, who is usually referred to as “a Kremlin connected analyst”.  None of this information makes Chadaev seem like a good candidate for anything within the Administration, especially if he is supposed to be working with Surkov.

Happy Birthday

Ramzan Kadyrov.  Why else would a court award him damages in his case against Oleg Orlov?  Of course, the likelihood of getting shot if they did not rule in Kadyrov’s favour could also be a factor.  And does Ramzan really need that money?  One of his horses is probably worth 10 times that (if not more).

So what was the point?  Symbolism, my friends.  “Symbolic damages” equal symbolism.  A message, if you will.  And the message sent was this: I can get away with murder, and there is nothing you can do to stop me.  You cannot even accuse me of it after the fact.

Once again, the question is raised: is Ramzan operating with the tacit approval of Putin or is he out of control?  Or is the only person capable of at least partially controlling him Slava Surkov?

Pavel Baev

has a great piece on the Tandemocracy.  He addresses several topics that I have mentioned in previous posts.

First,

The common opinion is that this claim for leadership [in Medvedev’s Gazeta article] can only be taken seriously if it is accompanied by action; but Medvedev escaped from this self-laid trap by departing on his state visit to Switzerland, followed by his trip to the United States.

In paragraph 5, Baev brings up the issue of replacements, and Yury Luzhkov:

The immediate problem for Medvedev is the reshuffling of the cadre that would demonstrate his authority to “hire-and-fire,” which is the main source of power in any bureaucratic system. Replacement of several governors does not quite fit the bill, because the real proof can only be delivered by promoting new people to the higher echelons of federal bureaucracy, while among the regional leaders, the key figure is Moscow’s Mayor Yury Luzhkov, who defends his turf with fierce determination and controls tighter than ever the forthcoming elections to the city Duma (Kommersant-Vlast, September 28).

There are only so many people Medvedev can fire (though I do not exactly like to use that word in reference to the Tandemocracy).  People who are out? Anyone in the Power Ministries really.  These include: Rashid Nurgaliyev, Nikolai Patrushev, Anatoly Serdyukov, and Alexander Bortnikov.  I still hold that the next to go will most likely be Yuri Chaika (possibly after Medvedev’s speech to the Duma next month).

As I’ve discussed previously, Luzhkov’s hold on Moscow is too strong to get rid of him.  I would not rule out Gromov, however.

Baev writes on the happenings in the Executive Office in paragraph 6:

Medvedev may be a master of Kremlin intrigue, but he is clearly stuck with the dilemma of having too few loyalists, who remain rather indifferent to the ideology of “innovation,” and mistrust the awakening reformers who would never prove sufficiently loyal. The Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) has tried to position itself as the key think-tank for Medvedev’s strategy, but their economic recommendations are combined with a plea to sack Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, who is in charge of PR (Ekho Moskvy, October 2). Medvedev, however, remains reluctant to relax control over the crucial media instrument –the three national television channels– and keeps Surkov close, not daring even to replace the top speechwriter (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 30).

There’s a lot of information here, so let’s break it up.  “…[Medvedev] is clearly stuck with the dilemma of having too few loyalists, who remain rather indifferent to the ideology of “innovation,” and mistrust the awakening reformers who would never prove sufficiently loyal.”

What Baev seems to be saying is that Medvedev is being pulled in two directions.  First by the Ciliviki (the lawyers, and bureaucrats) who are somewhat scared of change.  Or if not frightened of it, at least (in Baev’s words) “indifferent”.  Second by Yurgens, et al (see page on Institute for Contemporary Development) who perhaps expect too much, and would jump ship when Medvedev did not meet their expectations.

Some interesting news on Slava Surkov:

“The Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) has tried to position itself as the key think-tank for Medvedev’s strategy, but their economic recommendations are combined with a plea to sack Vladislav Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, who is in charge of PR (Ekho Moskvy, October 2).”

Baev also implies that Surkov is tied to (and supports) Dzhakhan Pollyeva (something that does not surprise me in light of their biographies):

“Medvedev, however, remains reluctant to relax control over the crucial media instrument –the three national television channels– and keeps Surkov close, not daring even to replace the top speechwriter (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 30).”

Finally, Baev brings up Anatoly Chubais, and the accusations he is facing over the incident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station.  He concludes:

Many “modernizers” have become guilty by association, which means that Medvedev is left to drag his failing presidency to the conclusion that he was right about the inability of the system to cope with the crisis but wrong about its capacity for reforming itself.

Stumble!

For all his faults, and downright evilness, Ramzan Kadyrov does have his moments of comic relief.  The latest is aided by Movladi and the folks at Kavkaz Center.  First, the picture of Kadyrov is pretty amazing (and slightly frightening).

Most of Ramzan’s claims seem to be bogus. Particularly this one: “Earlier, two of his assistants – Magomed Hambiev (former CRI defense minister) and Shaa Turlaev (former head of CRI president Maskhadov’s guard), who took the side of Russian infidels, were also sent to mountains to fight against Mujahideen.”

This is confusing because I thought that Shaa Turlaev could hardly walk.  Maybe I am thinking of someone else, though… okay, I found a picture of Shaa without a leg, but I think he sustained other injuries later.

There is some relevance to Putinania in this article, when Kadyrov says: “Vladislav Yurivich is a strategist, he knows all difficulties in state politics, all its kitchen. He often helps me with advice. When I am tired, when I am irritated, saddened, I go to him. He listens to me and so calmly, delicately, lightly explains to me the hardships of the moment, and I calm down.”

Vladislav Surkov, the man who does everything.