Ministry of Construction and Housing and Utilities

Dmitry Medvedev’s Government got a new ministry last week.  The former Federal Agency for Construction and Housing and Utilities was elevated to the Ministry of Construction and Housing and Utilities by President Vladimir Putin.

Utilities and housing have been a problem in Russia throughout Putin’s rule, and something that people feel strongly about since it effects their daily lives and routines.  A rate freeze on domestic utilities has been proposed for next year due to concerns about inflation [http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/sechin-backs-tariff-freeze-and-boasts-40-increase-in-capitalization/486573.html].  By elevating construction, housing and utilities to a ministerial position, Putin seems to be indicating that he understands that this subject is important.  This was emphasized during his first meeting with the new Minister, Mikhail Men [http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19529].

So Putin has just placed the problem of construction, housing, utilities directly in Prime Minister Medvedev’s lap.  So when the newly formed ministry fails to enact real reform (and it will fail), the blame will fall on Medvedev and his government.

Newly appointed Minister Mikhail Men’s career is filled with holes, but his main claim to fame seems to be his father, the famous Soviet priest Alexander Men, who was assassinated in 1990 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Men].  Mikhail Men was a deputy mayor in Moscow, and then Governor of the Ivanovno region (I am still trying to track down dates on those).  In addition to his political activity, Men [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Men_Project] is also a professional musician who released a hard-rock album in 2004.  Like Dmitry Medvedev, he is also a fan of Deep Purple.  So the Putin team’s bench is a little longer than we thought, but if all they’re looking for is someone to play seat warmer, they could pick any fan of Deep Purple on the streets of Moscow or any city in Russia.

Putin’s Pike

Vladimir Putin’s fishing expedition in Tyva lit up the Russian blogosphere over the weekend.  There were lots of bromance jokes about Putin and Medvedev, and debates about the size of the fish Putin caught (conclusion: much smaller than the claimed 21kg).

But there was also an interesting post by Andrei Malgin on his LJ blog with the conspiracy theory that the fishing trip did not take place at all.  And that the photos released were actually from a previous trip to Tyva in 2007.  He notes that the Kremlin never noted Putin’s visit to Tyva on the dates he was allegedly there.  Furthermore, the Kremlin press pool was not informed of the trip, nor were they present.  Finally, the cutter Shoigu and Putin are in has an MChS (Emergencies Ministry) tag on it.  This is important because Shoigu was the long-time Minister of the Emergencies Ministry until last year.

The evidence does not look good, but… here is the thing: we know Peskov lies.  It is an open secret in Moscow.  Someone once joked, “When Peskov lies, you know he is lying, and he knows that you know he is lying.”  Frankly, I don’t think he can help himself.  But there is a difference between lying in an interview about how much Putin’s pike weighed (and who really cares anyway?), and posting photos that are 6 years old and trying to pass them off as being only a week old.  Why would you lie about something like that?  What does it get you?

One commenter joked: “Maybe Putin has already died, and we don’t know it.”

Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov denied on Sunday that the photos were from the 2007 trip.

United Russia’s Prospects for the 2011 Duma Election

Even Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to NATO apologized for the poor timing of the announcement.  While Rogozin’s Twitter comment may have been a joke, Dmitry Medvedev’s announcement yesterday was not.  Looking nervously at the camera, the President of Russia stated that he was instructing the military to ramp up, and prepare for a missile defense shield in Europe.  Speaking slowly and clearly, Medvedev also threatened to place Iskanders in Kaliningrad.

This was the second time in as many days that Medvedev had come out with a big defense announcement.  On Monday, at a meeting in Vladikavkaz, the President had claimed that the 2008 war in Georgia had been carried out in an attempt to prevent Georgian ascension to NATO.  While the threats and posturing are nothing new, the timing did seem a bit suspicious.  The elections for the State Duma are in 10 days, and the Russian President is leading the party lists for United Russia, the majority party.

For the leading party, United Russia, the numbers do not look promising.  In the last few weeks there have been several leaks about how badly United Russia is doing in the polls. Levada Center, the leading polling organization in Russia, revealed the results of its most recent poll.  Levada takes this poll on a monthly basis, and always asks the same question: “If the election for the Russian State Duma was held next Sunday, would you vote in them, and which party would you vote for?”

Levada’s most recent results revealed that United Russia’s numbers are falling, with just 51% of their respondents answering that they would vote for United Russia.  In the same poll, the Communists would get 20% of the vote.  Sergei Mironov’s party would get only 7%, and LDPR (Zhirinovsky’s party) would receive 14%.

Compare this to the other polling organizations in Russia, VTsIOM, and FOM.  VTsIOM’s most recent poll only gives United Russia 40%, and FOM gives United Russia 39%.  Both organizations give the Communists 13%.

To give you an idea of how bad this is, United Russia currently holds 64.3% of the seats in the State Duma.  The authorities are patently worried.  In early November the President’s office leaked their own internal poll numbers.  These numbers were closer to VTsIOM’s numbers.  The leak appeared to be deliberate.  A portrayal of weakness from people who do not normally like to appear weak.

So the numbers are bad, and different regions have sought to make up those numbers using “administrative resources”.  This has, so far, included pressuring the clergy to urge their congregants to vote for United Russia, publishing posters with the same background as the Election Commission’s posters, and hanging up posters in public schools.

Stories have also leaked that governors’ jobs are on the line, if they fail to produce a certain result. In Novgorod, recent poll numbers placed United Russia at 40%, but fail to take into account regions like Chechnya where Ramzan Kadyrov has promised to deliver “110% of the vote”.  While most people have treated Kadyrov’s oath as a joke, in the 2007 election, Chechnya did deliver over 90% of the vote to United Russia.

Utilizing so-called “administrative resources”, and with help from Governors anxious to keep their jobs, United Russia could still potentially receive 60% of the seats in the next parliamentary session.  While this is not a Constitutional majority, it would enable the ruling party, and Vladimir Putin to claim a mandate.  A necessity if they intend to follow through on their “modernization” platform.  And, perhaps more importantly, a necessity for Putin to shore up support for the Presidential elections scheduled in March.

VTsIOM Poll

VTsIOM conucted a poll recently on the members of the Government, and I was kind of surprised by the results.

First of all, Sergei Shoigu has the highest approval rating of anyone in the government (people were not asked about Putin).  I have mixed feelings about Shoigu.  He has held the post of Emergency Situations Minister since Boris Yeltsin came to power.  On the one hand, I feel like he must be doing something right, and his approval rating has always been pretty high.  But then yesterday’s incident makes me pause to think.  His solution to the Bulgaria tragedy is to put black boxes in all boats.  What?  That’s his response?  Quite frankly, the man has never been good in an “emergency” (Beslan, Dubrovka, etc.), and I’m still not sure where he is getting such high numbers.  Unless people are just saying that they like him because they know who he is (he has been in the Government since 1991, after all).  That’s the only thing I can come up with anyway.  Also, presumably, the poll was conducted before the Bulgaria tragedy.

Here are some more numbers:

• Sergei Lavrov — 47% approval rating.  Okay, I’ll buy that.  He’s one of the most public figures of the Government since he is the head diplomat.
• Sergei Ivanov — 32% approve of the job he’s doing (or have heard of him, anyway).

And the lows are:

• Andrei Fursenko — 50% disapprove of the job he is doing.  Hardly suprising since he’s the face of education “reform”, and most teachers are upset about it.
• Tatiana Golikova — 41% disapprove of the job she is doing.  What is she doing, anyway?  I don’t even know.
• Alexei Kudrin — 34% disapprove of the job he is doing.  Well, he’s not exactly populist, is he?  And I doubt he’s really out to win any popularity contests.  But then none of these people are, are they?  Their job doesn’t depend on what the general populace think of them.  It only depends on what Putin and Medvedev think of them, and their work.

Some other numbers:

• 75% of people don’t know who Igor Sechin is;
• 72% don’t know who Vyacheslav Volodin is; and
• 71% have never heard of Igor Shuvalov.

I was a little shocked when I saw those numbers, but I bet if you asked Americans the same questions about their Government, they would say the same thing.

My 2012 Election Predictions

There is probably not a good way to say this beyond the absolute, blunt truth: Putin is bored.  He hates being PM, and I am not sure that anyone could, or should, blame him for it.  Putin has essentially been Mr Russia for the last 3 years and some odd months.  Even Miss America is only Miss America for one year, and there is a reason for it.  That reason is, of course, that she’d go stark, staring mad if she had to do it for longer.

Kudrin for PM?

This WSJ article showed up in my Google Reader this morning (several days late), and since I am following the so-called elections pretty closely, I thought it would be an appropriate lead in to some things I’ve been thinking about.

Here is what the article claims:

Several members of Moscow’s elite business and economic circles have suggested that Mr. Putin may run for president and, when he’s inaugurated, select longtime Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin as the country’s next prime minister.

I can see why this alternative would be attractive to people, particularly investors (as the article says later).  I personally am a huge fan of Alexei Leonidovich.

But here is why this is wrong: first of all, the qualities that make Kudrin a good excellent MinFin are not necessarily the qualities that are needed for PM: “…he is seen as a fiscally conservative, clearheaded technocrat with an almost single-minded focused on reining in budget spending.”

If Kudrin were PM under Medvedev, it would be more believable (you need someone conservative to kind of hold Medvedev back, I think).  But as a balance to Putin, which is this author’s premise, Kudrin would not be a good choice.

Also, lest we forget, Igor Sechin is the counter-balance to Kudrin, and putting Kudrin over Sechin would not really mesh with the way VVP “leads”.

So that’s where I am going with this.

P.S. I really am going to write the piece about the Presidency, I swear!

Yuri Chaika

Yuri Chaika‘s term as Prosecutor General is up in 18 days. In the next three weeks, the decision must be reached as to whether or not Chaika will remain at his post for another 5 year term.

The Russian Constitution of 1993 states in Articles 102h and 129 that the Prosecutor General is appointed by the President for a 5 year term subject to the approval of the upper house of Parliament, the Federation Council.

Usually this would not be an issue. Chaika would go before the Federation Council, possibly answer a few easy questions, and the Federation Council would vote to approve him for another term.

Medvedev’s Speech

I am posting a link to Medvedev’s speech at Davos. I have not had time to go through it yet, but I will post some comments in the next few days.  A lot of people were worried that the terror attack somehow changed the subject from Yukos, and Magnitsky to other issues.  However, I think that the real issue remains the same no matter which subject you are talking about: corruption.  Anyway, commentary forthcoming…

P.S.  Miriam Elder had an excellent piece published in The Atlantic about the issues surrounding the bombing of Domodedovo.

Tandem 2012?

I found two articles this past week on the Tandem, and its continued viability.  The first was by Andrei Kolesnikov of Novaya Gazeta, published by Open Democracy.  In his article, Kolesnikov cites examples of tension within the Tandem ranging from Okhta Centre in Saint Petersburg (a win for Medvedev, per Kolesnikov) to Khimki (a win for Putin), and, of course, the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov (a win for Medvedev).

Clan Wars

I was going to write a piece about Yuri Luzhkov, but Russia Profile has had some good articles about the subject recently, so it seems a moot point.  I would, however, like to postulate a theory about the clan wars.

There have been two articles recently that have inspired an idea.  SWP had an entry that called Putin a “capo di tutti capi”.  Essentially, his whole job is to keep peace between the clans, and moderate when there is a problem.

Meanwhile, Yulia Latynina latest article in The Moscow Times claims that Putin is bored, and that is why he has been travelling the country.

These two pieces got me to thinking, what if the so-called clan wars are set up by Putin for his own entertainment?  Think about it.  Was the Sechin-Cherkessov fight really necessary?  It was all set up by Putin.  Cherkessov’s job was not even real.  It could have just as easily been left to Customs, or whoever was overseeing it beforehand.  Of course, there were practicalities involved, and I see that.  But to create a job that was somewhat fake, and then to hamper it at every turn, implies that you want that person to fail.  Or at least that you want some excitement out of it.  Which we all certainly got.

Then you have the obvious Sergei Ivanov vs Dmitry Medvedev.  Does anything more need to be said about this one?  Besides the fact that it was unnecessary, it also exposed Sergei Borisovich as kind of crazy.  Although, has anyone noticed how much more relaxed Sergei Borisovich is looking now?  Seriously, check out some recent pictures.

And now you have Chaika vs Bastrykin.  This is just a repeat of Sechin-Cherkessov. A job was created that was totally unnecessary, in order to pit two men against each other.  Plus, you have the added problem that Yuri wanted the job of Pros Gen for a long time, was promised it, then had it taken away, then was given it, and is now being forced to fight for it every day.  So there has to be more than a little anger involved.  Which is more than a little worrying.  At least with the exposure that Ivanov-Medvedev received, there was some accountability, and nobody died (we think).  Chaika-Bastrykin has the potential to deteriorate to a degree that Sechin-Cherkessov never did.  And that’s a problem.

Oh Stanislav Belkovsky…

you seriously read way too much into things.  Not that I’m criticising.  I tend to do the same thing.  I am just not sure that I agree with you.

Stanislav Belkovsky, an independent analyst, said United Russia was aware that Medvedev had planned to halt the highway project and suggested that cracks were emerging in its once-steadfast alliance to Putin.

“The decision shows that the party is responding to orders from the top powers represented by Dmitry Medvedev and not to Vladimir Putin, the party leader,” he said.

And does anyone really believe that you are “independent”?  What does that even mean?  That you’re not paid by the Kremlin?  But surely someone is paying you.

And does this go along with Frolov’s latest piece of propaganda about how “green” DAM is?  Maybe Frolov talked DAM into this decision.

P.S. The photo of Bono is awesome.

Pictures!

Foreign Policy has a nice slide show of pictures comparing how Putin and Medvedev (or Vova & Dima) “spent their summer vacation”.  It’s amusing, and the conclusion is an interesting one:

“Judging by the optics of the summer’s PR shots, he [Putin] may be done sharing the spotlight.”

The Numbers Are In

And the winner is…

Thoughts On Kyrgyzstan

Is it even called Kyrgyzstan anymore?  I thought it was the Kyrgyz Republic.  Obviously, I do not follow the CIS all that much.  But the way the events have been “analysed” in the Western media have been somewhat upsetting to say the least.

In my view, and from my observations, what happened says more about the personality of Vladimir Putin than about any over-arching foreign policy goal of the Russian Federation and her government.  What people fail to understand is that Putin reacts to things.  There is no real thought or strategy to it.  That’s why Dima Medvedev is now fear mongering, and claiming that Kyrgyzstan could erupt into Civil War.  Because they did not think through what they were doing.  It was all reaction, and anger, and frustration because Bakaiev turned around, and stabbed them in the back.  Understandable, but not a wise, or even rational, way to conduct any kind of foreign policy.

So, while there is a sense of the unpredictable in Putin, and his Government, overall:

(1) he is very predictable;

(2) he takes things very personally;

(3) anything that offends him is offensive to broader Russia as a whole, and therefore he has no compunction of using the State as a tool of revenge;

(4) he values loyalty above every other virtue (I cannot stress this enough, and will repeat it frequently).

Will this be tried again in other countries?  It depends on how “loyal” the leaders of the other countries in the region are.

Dmitry Trenin

on the Tandemocracy:

Westerners often see Russian politics in terms of a high-level struggle between liberals and conservatives: Ligachev and Yakovlev under Gorbachev; reformers and nationalists under Yeltsin; siloviki and economic liberals under Putin.

They also view Russia in terms of a tradition whereby every new tsar partly repudiates the legacy of his predecessor, creating a political thaw at the beginning of a new reign. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization is Exhibit A.

Both methods were used to describe the Putin-Medvedev relationship ― to understand its nature and dynamic, and what it portends for Russia. But observers remain puzzled.